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Anomalous self-experiences have been described as a prerequisite for anomalous perceptual 
experiences. Later, these anomalous perceptual experiences may then be metacognitively 
appraised as distressing, maintaining these experiences and later leading to anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs. This model of anomalous events may potentially be driven by perceptual 
biases and metacognitive deficits. This cross-sectional study explored the association between 
perceptual biases, metacognition and anomalous self- and perceptual experiences and 
delusional beliefs in First Episode Psychosis (FEP) and a matched healthy control sample. 
Fifty-eight individuals with FEP and seventy-two healthy controls were included in the main 
analysis. Increased auditory perceptual biases were significantly associated with increased state 
and trait anomalous self-experiences, in particular alienation from surroundings and emotional 
numbing. No significant associations were found between metacognitive efficiency and 
anomalous experiences. These findings may be consistent with the minimal self-disturbance 
model of schizophrenia spectrum vulnerability, particularly with the hyperreflexivity concept. 
 
























Anomalous experiences refer to a rich variety of psychic phenomena. These experiences can 
be divided into three (somewhat overlapping) categories: anomalous self-experiences 
(distortions in experience of self and being); anomalous perceptual experiences (distortions of 
sensory events); and anomalous (delusional) beliefs (unusual thoughts or beliefs). Anomalous 
self-experiences may precede and generate anomalous perceptual experiences (hallucinations) 
(Nelson, Parnas, & Sass, 2014; Nelson & Raballo, 2015; Raballo, 2012, 2017) and anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs may develop from anomalous perceptual experiences (Corlett, Frith, & 
Fletcher, 2009; Fletcher & Frith, 2009). These experiences/beliefs may be common within the 
general population (Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006; Kelleher et al., 2012) but their intensity 
and/or frequency is increased in those with psychotic or other mental disorders (Brett, Johns, 
Peters, & McGuire, 2009; Reininghaus et al., 2016; Yung, Phillips, Yuen, & McGorry, 2004). 
Therefore, understanding the cause of such experiences may be important for understanding 
factors that drive the onset of psychosis.  
 
Studies have suggested anomalous self-experiences may be explained by the following factors: 
perceptual biases (Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2011), e.g. perceiving a stimulus (a voice) as 
present when it was absent; source-monitoring deficits (Nelson, Whitford, Lavoie, & Sass, 
2014b) e.g. difficulties in the internal monitoring system (Frith, 1987; Frith 1992; Blakemore 
et al. 1999); and aberrant salience (Nelson, Whitford, Lavoie, & Sass, 2014a) e.g. difficulty in 
failing to suppress attention to irrelevant information (Hemsley, 1993). Aberrant salience may, 
at times, lead to perceptual biases, which have been tested using signal detection theory (SDT). 
SDT studies have demonstrated that anomalous experiences are associated with perceptual 
signal detection biases (Barkus et al., 2010; Bentall & Slade, 1985; Kok, Kouider, Lange, & 
Supe, 2015; Mussgay & Hertwig, 1990). These studies highlight that those with psychosis have 
a lower threshold for recognizing a stimulus as present (Moritz, Woodward, Jelinek, & Klinge, 
2008; Moritz et al., 2017; Veckenstedt et al., 2011), which has recently been associated with 
aberrant salience in vivo using experience sampling methodology (Reininghaus et al., 2018). 
 
Together, these neurocognitive factors (aberrant salience, source-monitoring deficits, and 
perceptual biases) may contribute to i) diminished self-presence, i.e. a weakened sense of 
existing as a subject of awareness and ii) hyperreflexivity, i.e. a heightened awareness of 





This has been recently described in a bio-pheno-social model of anomalous self-experiences 
(Sass, Borda, Madeira, Pienkos, & Nelson, 2018). This model suggests the role of “primary” 
hyper-reflexivity or diminished self-presence, as a result of salience/bias, can undermine an 
individual’s sense of being grounded within a shared world and is likely to alienate the self, 
possibly leading to an array of “secondary” anomalous self-experiences (varieties of 
depersonalisation, disturbances in stream of consciousness, distorted bodily experiences and 
existential reorientation) (Nelson, Sass, & Škodlar, 2009; Sass & Parnas, 2017). As a result of 
the perceptual biases and diminished self-presence/hyperreflexivity, an individual overly 
focuses on (generally implicit) bodily sensations (anomalous bodily experiences) and may find 
it difficult to make sense of their surroundings or previous events as there is an overload of 
information (alienation from surroundings; anomalous subjective recall) and may 
downregulate emotional responsivity in order to prevent overstimulation or distress (emotional 
numbing) (Sierra, Baker, Medford, & David, 2005). 
 
Anomalous self-experiences have been suggested to give rise to anomalous perceptual 
experiences (Nelson et al., 2014; Raballo, 2017; Raballo & Preti, 2018a). This is one route via 
which anomalous perceptual experiences develop (an another route is that aberrant perceptual 
experiences, e.g. perceptual organisation, contribute to disturbed self-experience (Uhlhaas & 
Mishara, 2007)), as the anomalous self-experiences become strengthened and thematized 
(Raballo, 2012; Raballo & Preti, 2018b). Hemsley (1993) described the presence of anomalous 
perceptual experience as a “weakening” of top-down influences, leading to a mismatch 
between top-down and bottom-up processing (Gray, 1995; John & Hemsley, 1992). Recently, 
predictive processing framework has suggested that, within psychosis, there is a weakening of 
the use of prior beliefs and overreliance on sensory occurrences (Sterzer et al., 2018). This loss 
of top-down predictions causes extra weight to be given to external influences which makes 
aspects in the environment become overly salient (Adams, Stephan, Brown, Frith, & Friston, 
2013), which may explain the presence of perceptual biases. Auditory perceptual biases are 
more frequent within individuals with schizophrenia and hallucinations, compared to those 
with schizophrenia and no hallucinations (Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2012), suggesting a 
specific association with hallucinations. Therefore, anomalous perceptual experiences may be 
predicted by perceptual biases directly, or via anomalous self-experiences.  
 
Recent research has begun to assess the role of metacognition within anomalous experiences. 





an appraisal of cognitive processes, self, abilities and experiences (Nelson & Narens, 1990). In 
particular, metacognitive sensitivity involves unconscious knowledge which generates a 
“feeling of knowing” or “knowing that you know” (Sherman et al., 2015). Metacognitive 
sensitivity can be assessed using a signal detection task, e.g. the participant must make a 
judgment of whether a visual stimulus (white dot) was present or absent within a noisy, moving 
picture, e.g. “Was the dot present or absent?”. Then making a second judgment of confidence 
in relation to the first judgment, e.g. “Do you have high or low confidence?”. This second 
measure can be used to calculate metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’), which describes how 
closely matched confidence ratings are to correct vs incorrect trials. Metacognitive efficiency 
score is metacognitive sensitivity score divided by the objective task performance score (meta-
d’/d) (Fleming & Lau, 2014). Within all theories of metacognition, whether at the perceptual 
level outlined above or an appraisal of bias or higher-order belief system, the metacognitive 
model infers that the person holds erroneous beliefs or thoughts about their cognitive processes 
(perceptions, appraisals or beliefs), which may impact on their experiences or, and functions 
within, the world. 
 
Metacognition, assessed by within-task confidence ratings, has been shown to be significantly 
poorer in psychosis (Bliksted et al., 2017; Davies et al., 2018) and those with psychosis have a 
tendency to be overconfident in incorrect responses (metacognitive bias) (Gawęda, Moritz, & 
Kokoszka, 2012). These metacognitive deficits are present in those with a history of 
hallucinations (Gawęda, Mikuła, Szelenbaum, & Kokoszka, 2014) and those at high-risk 
(Gawęda et al., 2018), in such that those with hallucinations or psychotic experiences may be 
less able to understand these experiences and demonstrate a reduction in metacognitive 
confidence in these groups. However, this research has not been consistent (Gawęda et al., 
2013). The inconsistencies in this area may be due to varying experimental controls across 
tasks, e.g. lack of control for objective performance, which is important to control in order to 
accurately assess metacognition. This lack of control may have impacted metacognitive 
efficiency scores (Balzan, Woodward, Delfabbro, & Moritz, 2016; Fleming & Lau, 2014). 
Importantly, perceptual ability and metacognition can be modality-specific abilities (Fleming, 
Ryu, Golfinos, & Blackmon, 2014; Morales, Lau, & Fleming, 2018) and anomalous perceptual 
experiences can occur across several modalities (see Mitchell et al., 2017). This suggests the 
possible role of metacognitive efficiency in anomalous experiences and, as experiences become 






Metacognitive difficulties may maintain the presence of anomalous perceptual experiences 
and, later, predict anomalous (delusional) beliefs. The hierarchical framework from anomalous 
perceptual experiences to anomalous delusional beliefs has been suggested by many theories 
(Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 
2002). This may be connected via metacognition and, therefore, metacognition may also 
predict anomalous (delusional) beliefs (Cella, Swan, Medin, Reeder, & Wykes, 2014; Moritz 
et al., 2014; Moritz et al., 2015; Moritz, Woodward, & Moritz, 2006; Warman, 2008).  
 
Integrating this research, we suggest that anomalous self- and perceptual experiences and 
delusional beliefs may be associated within a hierarchical framework. It is hypothesized that 
there is an indirect relationship between anomalous self-experience (within this study, 
depersonalization) and anomalous (delusional) belief, mediated by anomalous perceptual 
experiences.  Next, anomalous self- and perceptual experiences may be predicted by perceptual 
biases (and hyperreflexivity) and metacognitive efficiency. Through this hierarchical 
framework, metacognition may also predict anomalous (delusional) beliefs (see figure 1). As 
experiences become more explicit, it is hypothesized that there is a modality-specific 
association; visual perceptual biases and metacognitive efficiency may be associated with 
anomalous visual experiences, and vice versa for auditory modality.  
 






This present study involved a cross-sectional design with experimental tasks and 
questionnaires to investigate the association between perceptual biases, metacognition and 
anomalous self- experiences, anomalous perceptual experiences, and delusional experiences in 
FEP and healthy controls matched on age, gender and education level.  
 
2.2 Procedure  
 
All participants provided informed consent to take part. Participants were asked to complete 
two signal detection tasks, counterbalanced between participants. Protocol can be reviewed in 
Wright, Fowler and Greenwood (2018). All measures were completed by the first author, 





use and score all the measures and demonstrated acceptable inter-rater reliability, according to 
agreed definitions with an experienced clinician.  
 
2.3 Participants  
 
Individuals with psychosis (18 years old and over) were recruited through a convenience 
sample from Early Intervention in Psychosis services in Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation 
Trust, and a minority were re-recruited from a previous first episode psychosis (FEP) sample 
(Davies, Fowler, & Greenwood, 2017). Seventy-seven participants were recontacted from a 
previous FEP cohort study (Davies, Fowler & Greenwood, 2017) of whom 29 agreed to take 
part in the current and a longitudinal study (Wright, Davies, Fowler & Greenwood, 2019). 
These participants were complemented by new FEP participants. There were no differences in 
symptoms, general functioning, metacognition or IQ between those newly recruited into the 
study compared to those recruited from the previous FEP study. All participants had been 
engaged in the Early Intervention Service (EIS) for at least 3 months prior to participating in 
the study and were reported by a psychiatrist in EIS as presenting with first episode of 
psychosis (F29), including both affective and non-affective psychosis. Participants with 
primary diagnoses of substance misuse disorder or organic neurological impairment were 
excluded. Healthy control participants were recruited as a comparison group, matched with the 
clinical group on age and gender (Table 1 provides information on difference statistics). 
Participants with current mental health problems or family history of psychosis were excluded 
if they responded yes, to any of the following: currently experiencing mental health difficulties; 
on any psychotropic medication/substances; in contact with psychological or psychiatric 
services for psychological problems; immediate family member (parent/sibling) experienced 




2.4.1 Anomalous experience measures 
Anomalous self-experiences: Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale (trait and state versions) 
(Sierra & Berrios, 2000). The trait version includes 29 items assessing anomalous self-
experiences over the last 6 months, with 4 suggested subscales: ‘alienation from surroundings’, 
‘anomalous subjective recall’, ‘emotional numbing’ and ‘anomalous body experience’ (Sierra 





cut off from the world”. Participants respond on frequency of each statement, ranging from 0 
(never) to 5 (all the time), and the duration of this experience, ranging from 1 (few seconds) to 
6 (more than a week). Four scores are calculated: number of items endorsed (0-29), average 
frequency (0-5), average duration (1-6), and a total score calculated by summing scores for 
both frequency and duration, ranging from 0 to 319. For alienation from surroundings (9 items 
0-99), anomalous subjective recall (6 items 0-66), emotional numbing (5 items 0-55) and 
anomalous body experience (4 items 0-44). Psychometrics and further details of all measures 
can found in the protocol paper (Wright et al., 2018). The state version includes 22 items 
measuring anomalous self-experiences in a ‘here and now’ rating. Participants respond on a 
visual analogue scale from 0-100. Scores range from 0 to 2200. 
 
Anomalous perceptual experiences: Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences Questionnaire 
(Mitchell et al., 2017) is a 43-item scale measuring anomalous perceptual/sensory experiences 
with 6 subscales: auditory (“My ears have played tricks on me”), visual, smell, taste, bodily 
sensations, and sensed presence. Participants are asked to respond to the statements on a 5 point 
likert scale from never (0) to frequently (4). Scores are totaled for each modality (auditory [0-
28], visual [0-32], smell [0-32], taste [0-32], bodily sensations [0-32], and sensed presence [0-
16]). MUSEQ total score is obtained by summing all the subscale scores (0-172). The auditory 
subscale (7 items 0-28), visual subscale (8 items 0-32) and total score was used. 
 
Anomalous (delusional) beliefs: Schizotypal Symptom Inventory (Hodgekins et al., 2012). This 
is a 20-item measure assessing subthreshold psychotic symptoms which provides a total score 
with separate subscales for paranoia, anomalous experience and social anxiety (Hodgekins et 
al., 2012). Participants are asked to rate statements or questions on a five-point Likert scale to 
assess the recent frequency of each item (0 = not at all, 1 = occasionally, 2 = sometimes, 3 = 
often, 4 = all of the time). Scores on the SSI range from 0 to 296. This study used the paranoia 
subscale [6 items 0-24 (e.g. “I often feel that others have it in for me”)]. 
2.4.2 Recovery outcome 
The Questionnaire of Process of Recovery (Neil et al., 2009) is a 22-item self-report 
questionnaire which provides a score for an individual’s subjective recovery outcomes: hope, 
empowerment, confidence, connectedness with others, and reliance (psychosis participants 





agree) with a higher score indicating greater recovery. This measure was used to demonstrate 
the stage of recovery of the FEP participants. Studies have reported scores in the range of 50-
60 for schizophrenia samples (Morrison et al., 2013; Neil et al., 2009). 
2.4.3 Symptom measure  
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay & Fiszbein, 1987) (clinical participants only) is a 
standardised instrument for assessing symptom severity in schizophrenia (Hermes, Sokoloff, 
Stroup, & Rosenheck, 2012). This measure provides three separate scores for positive and 
negative symptoms and general psychopathology.  
 
2.4.4 Perceptual biases and metacognitive efficiency 
Experimental tasks were programmed in MATLAB using Cogent 2000. The task stimuli were 




Visual perceptual biases and metacognitive efficiency was assessed using a computerised 
visual detection task. The task involved reporting whether a Gaussian dot flashed in the middle 
of the screen within a display of moving visual noise. The participants were given a verbal 
explanation of the task and shown a demonstration. The experimental trials began with the 
presentation of a central fixation cross on a grey background followed by the presentation of 
moving static noise for 3000ms. In the stimulus present trials only, at a random time during the 
3000ms display of moving noise, the Gaussian dot was flashed in the middle of the screen. The 
contrast of the dot was titrated for each participant at ~67% correct responses, using a staircase 
procedure which adjusted the dot contrast with a standardized starting contrast. Participants 
were told the probability of the target being present would be 50%. Participants had up to 
3000ms to make a decision (present or absent) before the program timed out. No feedback was 
given. Participants were then asked to indicate either high or low confidence decision (see 
figure 2).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 
The first judgment captured hits (positive responses given when the stimulus was present), 





responses when the stimulus was present), and correct rejections (negative responses when the 
stimulus was absent). This was used to calculate perceptual sensitivity (d’): the ability to 
correctly report the stimulus (dot/tone) as either present or absent. A higher perceptual 
sensitivity score suggested better ability to detect the stimulus. These four scores can also be 
used to calculate perceptual bias (B):  the tendency to report one decision over the other, i.e. 
stating the stimuli was present when it was in fact absent, or vice versa. A perceptual bias score 
was calculated according to Bentall and Slade (1985). A score below 1 suggests a bias towards 
reporting presence when absent and a score above 1 suggests a bias towards reporting absent 
of stimuli when present. Equally, the second judgment captures the same four scores for 
confidence which can be used to calculate a score for metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’): the 
ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect judgments. Meta-d’ greater or less than d’ 
indicates metacognition is better or worse than d’ (Morales et al., 2018). Metacognitive 
efficiency involves taking into account objective performance (Fleming & Lau, 2014; 
Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), and is calculated as meta-d’-d’ (metacognitive sensitivity minus 
perceptual sensitivity) (Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010). 
 
Auditory paradigm 
Auditory detection task was matched with the visual paradigm in terms of structure, number of 
trials and procedure. The trials began with a presentation of auditory white noise for 3000ms. 
In the stimulus present trials only, at a random time during the white noise, a brief tone was 
presented. The volume of the tone was titrated at ~67% correct. Participants responded whether 
the tone was present or absent and rated their confidence in that decision (high/low confidence) 
(see figure 3). Perceptual sensitivity/biases and metacognitive sensitivity/efficiency scores 
were also derived from this auditory task.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
2.5 Planned analysis 
 
Firstly, we will assess group differences in the two signal detection tasks (e.g. perceptual 
sensitivity and bias, and metacognition) between individuals with psychosis and healthy 
controls. A correlational matrix assessed the relationship between the anomalous self- and 
perceptual experiences and delusional beliefs within the full sample. As an additional analysis, 
a mediation model was used to explore the indirect relationship between anomalous self-





correlational analysis were used to assess the relationship between perceptual biases, 
metacognition sensitivity/efficiency and the anomalous experience/beliefs measures. A 
Bonferroni-corrected p-value accounted for multiple comparisons. The data was then split by 
group to assess any potential differences between the FEP and healthy control groups. Multiple 
regression analyses were conducted to assess the role of perceptual biases in anomalous 




3.1 Sample characteristics 
Data was analyzed from 58 FEP and 72 healthy control participants. Thirty-eight FEP 
participants were using psychotropic medication.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
3.2 Anomalous experience measures 
A correlation matrix was created for association between anomalous self- and perceptual 
experiences and delusional beliefs measures in the full sample (see table 2).  
 




3.3 Mediation model  
A mediation analysis was conducted using Mplus with Multiple Mediation Model (structural 
equation modelling) using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), bootstrapping and 
corrected confidence intervals, following Preacher and Hayes (2008) causal steps of mediation. 
This mediation model was used to identify the indirect mediating effect of anomalous 
perceptual experiences between anomalous self-experience and anomalous (delusional) beliefs 
within the full sample. All scores were converted to z scores using sample means and standard 
deviations. Significant direct pathways were found between anomalous self-experience and 
anomalous perceptual experience (β=.64, p<.001) and anomalous perceptual experiences and 
anomalous (delusional) beliefs (β=.5, p<.001). Anomalous perceptual experiences significantly 
and fully mediated the relationship between anomalous self-experiences and anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs (β = .32, p<.001, ±95% CI [0.19, 0.45]). The pathway between anomalous 
self-experience and anomalous delusional beliefs was non-significant (p>.05) (see figure 4).  
Using the same process, we examined these relationships within the FEP group. Significant 
direct pathways were found between anomalous self-experience and anomalous perceptual 
experience (β=.59, p<.001) and anomalous perceptual experiences and anomalous (delusional) 
beliefs (β=.65, p<.001). Anomalous perceptual experiences significantly and fully mediated the 
relationship between anomalous self-experiences and anomalous (delusional) beliefs (β = .39, 
p<.001, ±95% CI [0.19, 0.6]). The pathway between anomalous self-experience and anomalous 
delusional beliefs was non-significant (p>.05). 
Using the same process, we examined these relationships within the healthy control group. 
Significant direct pathways were found between anomalous self-experience and anomalous 
perceptual experience (β=.74, p<.001), anomalous self-experience and anomalous delusional 
beliefs (β=.33, p=.01), and anomalous perceptual experiences and anomalous (delusional) 
beliefs (β=.27, p=.02). Anomalous perceptual experiences partially mediated the relationship 
between anomalous self-experiences and anomalous (delusional) beliefs (β = .19, p=.02, ±95% 
CI [0.03, 0.35]).  




For the auditory task, participants who scored within 1.5 SD of the mean were included (61-
71% correct), a limit used previously in metacognitive studies (Sherman, Seth, Barrett, & 
Kanai, 2015). This excluded 13 participants from analysis (7 FEP and 6 controls). For the visual 
task, participants who scored within 2 SD of the mean were included (61-71% correct). This 
excluded 6 participants from analysis (4 FEP and 2 controls). Visual and auditory tasks were 
analyzed separately. 
 
3.4 Comparison between groups 
Table 3 reported ANOVAs used to assess the differences in perceptual sensitivity, bias, 
metacognitive sensitivity and efficiency across FEP and healthy control groups.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
There were no significant differences in the perceptual biases and sensitivity, and 
metacognitive efficiency measures (table 3).  
 
3.5 Associations between perceptual biases, metacognition and anomalous experiences 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
To identify any potential differences in these associations between the clinical and non-clinical 
groups, we split the data and re-assessed the correlations (FEP and healthy control group). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
As there were no significant associations in the healthy control group. The following data will 
be presented in the FEP group only.  
 
After multiple comparison correction, there was a significant negative relationship between 




was conducted with auditory perceptual bias (independent variable) and CDS state score 
(dependent variable), with auditory perceptual sensitivity as a covariate, in the FEP group only. 
Even when controlling for auditory perceptual sensitivity, this model was significant and 
explained 15.5% of the variance in CDS scores, R=.25, [adjusted r2 .21], F(2, 38) 5.97, p=.01). 
Auditory perceptual biases predicted a significant change in CDS state score, (ΔR²=.16, F(1, 
36) 7.45 p=.01; see table 7). As the perceptual bias measure is negatively scored, this result 
demonstrates that increased perceptual biases towards rating ‘present’ was associated with 
increased CDS state measure scores. 
 
As there was a significant negative relationship between CDS trait with auditory perceptual 
biases in FEP (table 6), further analyses were conducted to assess the associations with 
individual subscales of CDS trait measure (table 8). After multiple comparisons, there was a 
significant negative relationships between auditory perceptual bias and CDS anomalous bodily 
experiences (ABE), CDS emotional numbing (EN), and CDS alienation from surroundings 
(AFS) in the FEP sample. 
 
Three stepwise regression analyses were used to assess the association between auditory 
perceptual bias and CDS anomalous bodily experiences (ABE), CDS emotional numbing (EN) 
and CDS alienation from surroundings (AFS), independent of auditory perceptual sensitivity.  
For CDS ABE, when controlling for auditory perceptual sensitivity, this model was non-
significant (p=.07). For CDS EN, even when controlling for auditory perceptual sensitivity, this 
model was significant and explained 14.2% of the variance in CDS EN scores, R=.14, [adjusted 
r2 .10], F(2, 47) 3.73, p=.03, CI -22.9,-1.67). Auditory perceptual biases predicted 10% of this 
variance and improved the model (ΔR²= .1, F(1, 45) = 5.44, p=.022). For CDS AFS, even when 
controlling for auditory perceptual sensitivity, this model was significant and explained 21% of 
the variance in CDS AFS score, R=.21, [adjusted r2 .17], F(2, 47) 5.96, p=.01, CI -23.58,-3.94). 
Auditory perceptual biases predicted 14% of this variance and improved the model (ΔR²= .14, 
F(1, 45) = 7.96, p=.01) 
 
4. Discussion 
This experimental cross-sectional study demonstrated that auditory perceptual biases (a lower 




trait anomalous self-experiences (within this study, depersonalization and, specifically, 
alienation from surroundings and emotional numbing) in the full sample, but specifically in the 
FEP group.  
 
A perceptual bias towards noticing a stimuli as present (within the environment) may be closely 
linked with the phenomenological concept of hyperreflexivity (heightened awareness of aspects 
of experience that are normally implicit (Sass et al., 2018) and the neurocognitive concept of 
aberrant salience (Kapur, 2003). Therefore, an individual who has a lower threshold for noticing 
auditory stimulus within the environment may be overly aware of themselves or their 
environment, which means aspects of these domains are overly salient. For example, a lower 
threshold for detecting a signal (message) from meaningless noise was previously demonstrated 
in those deemed as Ultra-High Risk (UHR) and who later transitioned to psychosis (Hoffman 
et al., 2007). This hypervigilance and hyperawareness of stimuli can alienate the individual, 
leave them feeling detached and experience difficulty identifying themselves from their 
environment (alienation from surroundings). From this hyperawareness, the individual may feel 
an information overload and as a consequence they “shut-down” their emotions to these 
anomalous experiences (emotional numbing), i.e. as a compensatory mechanism to avoid 
distress.  
 
Recently, Powers, Mathys and Corlett (2017) demonstrated the role of top-down cognitive 
biases, via predictive processing models, on auditory hallucinations in clinical participants. In 
a response to Powers et al. (2017), Nelson and Hartmann (2017) suggested that predictive 
processing models could explain disturbance of the “minimal” self; in this case, dissociation. 
The use of predictive processing to understand self-disturbance has been suggested by Clowes 
et al. (2017) as imprecise predictions must be explained, which may lead to hyperreflexivity 
and, therefore, dissociation (Seth, 2013; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2012). Difficulties with  
biases may lead to hyperreflexivity; heightened awareness to aspects of experience that are 
normally implicit (Nelson et al., 2014a, 2014b), which can undermine an individual’s sense of 
being grounded within a shared universe and is likely to alienate the self, leading to the 





Both perceptual biases and anomalous self-experiences may be considered low-level or sub-
conscious (e.g. not involving higher-level cognitive appraisals). However, contrary to previous 
research (Moritz, Woodward, Jelinek, & Klinge, 2008; Moritz et al., 2017; Veckenstedt et al., 
2011), this study did not demonstrate significant group differences in perceptual biases for those 
with FEP and those in the healthy control group. In this sample, individuals with FEP had fewer 
symptoms, including subclinical level hallucinations and similar scores on anomalous 
experiences (MUSEQ) as the healthy control group and better functioning compared to other 
FEP and schizophrenia studies (Fitzgerald et al., 2004; Hodgekins et al., 2015; Leucht et al., 
2005), which may suggest that the FEP group may have been further along in their recovery 
and may be able to more accurately reflect on their experiences, supporting the presence of 
seemingly intact metacognitive efficiency.  
 
Despite limited differences between the groups, only those within the FEP group demonstrated 
the association between propensity to perceptual bias associated with a vulnerability to 
experience anomalous self-experiences, suggesting that in FEP when perceptual biases are 
present they are likely to co-occur or be associated with anomalous self-experiences. This 
underlying, low-level relationship between perceptual biases and anomalous self-experiences 
may have been easier to capture as it was not confounded by positive symptoms. Later, this 
association may lead to hallucinations. The groups, however, did differ on the presence of state 
anomalous self-experiences, suggesting that those with FEP were experiencing high levels of 
state anomalous self-experiences in the moment during the assessments, compared to healthy 
controls. It is possible that the level of state anomalous experience may have impacted on one’s 
performance and hence the association with perceptual biases. This may be explained by, as 
suggested in the introduction, aberrant salience hypotheses in that an individual may have been 
more distracted or less able to focus attention due to additional environmental stimuli, leading 
to perceptual biases and dissociative experiences in the moment. This is a tentative hypothesis 
and future studies should aim to assess this with a more robust model using larger samples. 
 
The mediation model demonstrated that anomalous self-experiences are associated with 
perceptual experiences which are, in turn, associated with anomalous delusional beliefs. Once 
one takes into account the relationship between anomalous self-experiences and anomalous 




delusional beliefs in the FEP group, specifically. This suggests that anomalous self-experiences 
may lead to surface-level anomalous perceptual experiences (Varese et al., 2011; Nelson, 
Parnas & Sass, 2014) which, through the process of cognitive appraisal, may develop into 
higher-level (delusional) beliefs (Garety et al., 2001; Freeman et al., 2002). In the healthy 
control group only, there was a direct pathway between each component. Additional research 
needs to be conducted utilizing experimental or longitudinal designs to test this possible causal 
relationship. 
 
Contrary to the literature, perceptual biases were not associated with anomalous perceptual 
experiences. Haarsma et al. (2018) demonstrated strong evidence for weakened perceptual 
priors in ARMS group, compared to FEP and healthy controls. But stronger cognitive priors in 
the FEP group, compared to ARMS and healthy controls. Haarsma et al. suggested that high-
level cognitive priors may develop from weak low-level priors as a compensation (see Adams 
et al., 2013; Heinz et al., 2018; Sterzer et al., 2018). Future studies could aim to examine 
differences in these variables of interest in groups of individuals at various stages of their 
recovery or longitudinal across their recovery. 
 
Of importance here is that metacognitive efficiency was not associated with any of these 
anomalous experiences or beliefs. As suggested above, these individuals with FEP had fewer 
symptoms and both groups had intact metacognitive efficiency. It may be suggested that, when 
more symptomatic in psychosis, metacognitive efficiency may have a key role in anomalous 
experiences/beliefs. Assessing these variables across clinical groups will enable detection of 
core difficulties at different stages of illness to identify which factors are the main triggers of 
anomalous experiences. Associated with this, this lack of association with anomalous 
perceptual experiences/delusional beliefs may be because individuals within this FEP sample 
were currently, or recently, involved within the Early Intervention Service (EIS) which provides 
pharmacological (typically, antipsychotic medication to reduce the salience of anomalous 
experiences; Kapur, 2003) or psychological interventions (typically, CBT-p to alter the 
response to anomalous experiences and prevent maintenance of anomalous delusional beliefs; 
Birchwood & Trower, 2012). CBT-p has shown positive effects (Gould et al., 2015; Tarrier et 
al., 1998; Turner, Van Der Gaag, Karyotaki, & Cuijpers, 2014), and may have a role in 




has focused on changing faulty cognitive processes (Moritz et al., 2014); metacognitive therapy, 
based on changing beliefs about thoughts from Metacognitive Therapy for emotional distress 
(Wells & Matthews, 1994; Wells & Matthews, 1996) and shown to have a significant effect on 
reducing positive symptoms for those with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Morrison et al., 
2014); and metacognitive reflection and insight therapy (de Jong et al., 2018; Lysaker, Gagen, 
Moritz, & Schweitzer, 2018) or metacognitive interpersonal therapy (Dimaggio, Salvatore, 
Buonocore, Popolo, & Ottavi, 2018; Salvatore et al., 2012) focused on building a personal 
narrative for metacognitive reflection. Early Intervention Services within the UK offer CBTp 
and, whilst this study did not assess the use of this therapy, CBTp may be usefully integrated 
with metacognitive training within current services. Such integrated therapy trials could explore 
the possibility of improving metacognitive deficits in FEP and the association with reduction 
in psychotic experiences. 
 
Another reason may be the assessment of metacognition as this paper assessed metacognitive 
efficiency for perceptual experiences; a low-level metacognitive process which are inherently 
difficult to capture and, therefore, requires more experimental control during the assessment 
compared to other studies. Because of the additional control, it may be difficult to identify 
aspects of experience of psychosis which are specifically related to metacognitive efficiency 
using this measure. Alternatively, it is important to consider the alternative argument that 
metacognitive efficiency may not be associated with anomalous experiences. A small number 
of studies have assessed metacognitive efficiency, using meta-d’, and demonstrated limited 
association with brain function or psychotic symptoms in psychosis and healthy controls 
(Corcoran, Groot, Bruno, Johnston, & Cropper, 2018; Davies et al., 2018; Powers et al., 2017a). 
Future studies should aim to further develop this measure of metacognition, examining the 
reliability and validity, before its further application in a clinical group. In comparison, other 
studies have considered metacognitive processes at a higher order level and their impact on 
anomalous experiences (McLeod, Gumley, MacBeth, Schwannauer, & Lysaker, 2014; 
Morrison et al., 2011; Salvatore et al., 2012) and function (Lysaker et al., 2010; Wright, Davies, 
Fowler, & Greenwood, 2019; Wright, Mueser, McGurk, Fowler, & Greenwood, 2019), 







There are limitations to the study. Firstly, using the current cross-sectional design, it is not 
possible to explore triggers of anomalous experiences. Future studies could aim to use designs 
that experimentally induce a perceptual bias (see Powers, Mathys, & Corlett, 2017b), and assess 
how metacognition and anomalous experiences vary in response, allowing stronger inferences 
regarding causality, or adopt a longitudinal design involving follow up and repeated 
assessments over time. Secondly, many participants were biased towards the stimuli being 
absent, showing a strict and conservative approach to accepting the stimuli as present. For the 
FEP group, the progressed stage of their recovery may explain their conservative approach. In 
addition, we had to remove a number of participants for performing too high or too low. This 
may be due to a number of possibilities, including lack of concentration, difficulty in 
understanding the task instructions, or clinical difficulties. Future studies could aim to examine 
differences in performance in groups of individuals at various stages of their recovery or 
longitudinal across their recovery. Thirdly, the study demonstrated an association within only 
the auditory modality. Auditory anomalous experiences were slightly higher than other 
modalities, in support of current research in psychosis (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2017; Shergill, 
Murray, & McGuire, 1998; Waters et al., 2012). This modality-specific result may be an effect 
of the nature of the experience. Future studies could explore this within individuals with or 
without auditory hallucinations compared to other modalities. Fourthly, this study used only 
cross-sectional data and self-report measures may be highly intercorrelated due to method 
variance. Future studies should aim to assess these experiences across time, within a 
longitudinal design. Whilst this study excluded individuals from the healthy control group if 
they reported current or family history of mental health or use of medication, mental health can 
fluctuate and can go undiagnosed so there is potential for the group to have had historical 
difficulties which were not captured by these questions. Future research should aim to replicate 
this study by using more rigorous assessments, e.g. Mini International Neuropsychiatric 
Interview (MINI). Finally, educational level was significantly different between the groups, a 
previous confound in metacognition measures (Gaweda et al., 2013; Moritz et al., 2014). Whilst 
this study aimed to match participants on education level, individuals with psychosis were less 
likely to have completed A-Level qualifications than the healthy control group which resulted 
in a significant difference in education level. However, it should be highlighted that IQ was not 




psychosis. This is a more detailed measure of academic performance. Future studies should use 
IQ as a measure of comparison, rather than educational level which may not be best suited to 
capture ability.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study identified increased auditory perceptual biases were associated with increased 
anomalous self-experiences - in particular, alienation from surroundings and emotional 
numbing in FEP. Anomalous self-experiences which are associated with perceptual biases and 
may be the underlying causal vulnerability of anomalous perceptual experiences, which can be 
particularly distressing and disorienting. This study demonstrated auditory perceptual biases 
may represent an early causal vulnerability for anomalous self-experiences. This may be a 
therapeutic target for those with anomalous-self experiences to prevent initial or re-occurrence 
of anomalous perceptual experiences and delusional beliefs.  
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Figure 1: Proposed theoretical model for the associations between anomalous self- and 
perceptual experiences, anomalous delusional beliefs, perceptual biases and metacognitive 
efficiency. 
Figure 2: Visual detection metacognitive paradigm. 
Figure 1: Auditory detection metacognitive paradigm. 
 
Figure 4: Mediation model for anomalous self-experiences, anomalous perpetual experiences 





Table 1: Sample characteristics and descriptive statistics summary table. 




Age, yrs. (SD) 27.17 (S.D 1.3) range 
18-43 




Gender M/F (% males) 42/16 (72%) 51/21 (71%) Ӽ² (1, N = 
128) = .04, 
p=.84 
Education (level, %) No qualifications-
GCSE: 33% 
A-levels: 37% 





Degree or higher: 
28% 
Ӽ² (2, N = 
129) = 14.79, 
p=.01 
2-part IQ  105.32 (S.D 14.9) 106.2 (S.D 10.75) t(124) -.38, 
p=.7 
MUSEQ Auditory (0-28) 19.2 (7.2) 17.9 (5.64) t(106.06) 
1.21, p=.24, 
d=.2 
                                                 
1 Due to the way educational level was measured and the assumptions of Chi-Square tests, we had to collapse 
the groups into GCSE (no qualifications or GCSE-level), A-levels, Degree (degree or higher degree). 1 FEP 




MUSEQ Visual (0-28) 18.3 (8.0) 16.7 (5.8) t(100.7) 1.37 
p=.17, d=.22 
MUSEQ full total (0-172) 89.7 (34.8) 86.0 (26.2) t(128) .69, 
p=.49, d=.12 
CDS trait total (0-319) 49.95 (45.2) 40.7 (28.9) t(93.0) 1.41, 
p=.16, d=.24 
CDS state total (0-2200) 185.9 (255.5) 87.4 (125.2) t(77.12) 2.87, 
p=.01, d=.49 
CDS trait ABE (0-44) 11.2 (13.8) 8.9 (9.11) t(94.92) 1.09, 
p=.28, d=.2 
CDS trait EN (0-55) 10.9 (10.4) 8.89 (7.8) t(128) 1.28, 
p=.2, d=.22 
CDS trait ASR (0-66) 10.6 (8.9) 8.96 (6.6) t(103.2) 1.17, 
p=.24, d=.24 
CDS trait AFS (0-99) 10.6 (10.1) 7.9 (6.0) t(88.3) 1.83, 
p=.07, d=.33 




15.4 (7.5) 12.5 (4.8) t(92.1) 2.5, 
p=.01, d=.45 
SSI social anxiety (0-24) 16.03 (6.81) 12.89 (4.9) t(100.96) 
2.95, p=.01, 
d=.53 
Questionnaire of Process 
of Recovery (0-88) 
61.7 (13.3) N/A N/A 
PANSS positive (7-49) 12.4 (4.7) N/A N/A 
PANSS negative (7-49) 11.5 (4.0) N/A N/A 
PANSS general 
psychopathology (16-112) 






2.12 (1.45) N/A N/A 
MUSEQ = Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences Questionnaire; CDS = Cambridge 
Depersonalisation Scale; ABE = Anomalous Bodily Experiences; EN = Emotional Numbing; 
ASR = Anomalous Subjective Recall; AFS = Alienation From Surroundings; SSI = Schizotypal 
Symptom Inventory; PANSS = Positive And Negative Syndrome Scale. Bold: These ANOVAs 
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SSI Paranoia          1 r=.6 
p<.001 





Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the two signal detection tasks, with difference tests. 









1.25 (S.D .33) 1.09 (S.D .39) F(1, 117)= 
3.65, p=.06, 
d= .44 
Visual perceptual bias 
(increased score = bias 
towards absent)3 













1.11 (S.D .42) 1.19 (S.D .39) F(1, 113)= .05, 
p=.8, d=.19 








-.46 (S.D .52) -.40 (S.D .41) F(1, 113)= .39, 
p=.54, d=.13 
                                                 
2 Due to threshold, For the auditory task, participants who scored within 1.5 SD of the mean were included (61-
71% correct), a limit used previously in metacognitive studies (Sherman et al., 2015). This excluded 13 
participants from analysis (7 FEP and 6 controls). For the visual task, participants who scored within 2 SD of the 
mean were included (61-71% correct). This excluded 6 participants from analysis (4 FEP and 2 controls). There 
were no differences in the number of people excluded from each group for either of the tasks. (p>.05).  
3 Twenty-four participants (9 FEP and 15 controls) had a perfect score on absent trials, implying an 
infinite d’. We converted proportions of 0 and 1 to 1/(2N) and 1-1/(2/N), respectively, where N is the 











































































































MUSEQ = Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences Questionnaire; CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale; SSI = Schizotypal Symptom 
Inventory. Bold: These correlations held after multiple comparison correction.   
 
After correcting for multiple comparisons, there were no significant associations between visual perceptual biases or metacognitive efficiency 









































































































MUSEQ = Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences Questionnaire; CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale; SSI = Schizotypal Symptom 






































































































MUSEQ = Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences Questionnaire; CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale; SSI = Schizotypal Symptom 











Table 7: Regression values to show associations with state anomalous experiences in FEP 
group. 
  B SE B Β p value CI  
Model 2       
 Constant 2.26 .29    
 Auditory perceptual 
sensitivity 
.32 .38 .2 .40 -.45, 1.09 
 Auditory perceptual 
bias 
-.92 .34 -.64 .01 -1.61, -.24 
*= p<.05, **=p<.01      
 
Table 8: Correlational matrix for the association between auditory perceptual and 
metacognitive measures and subscales of anomalous self-experiences in the FEP group.  
N=48 CDS trait 
ABE 












































Note: CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale; ABE = Anomalous Bodily Experiences; EN 
= Emotional Numbing; ASR = Anomalous Subjective Recall; AFS = Alienation From 
Surroundings. Bold: These correlations held after multiple comparison correction. 
